The Gaza War Day 258, The War in the North

Hamas rule in Gaza has collapsed as the IDF has gradually removed from Hamas most of its ability to control Gaza. There is an effort by Hamas to show signs of governance, but wherever there is an attempt to deploy policemen on the streets or attempts to openly regain control of the civilian reality, the IDF moves in quickly and squashes it. Most of Hamas institutions and authorities are not functioning. Hamas members rob banks because they have no “governmental” money.

In addition to this, the IDF has divided the Strip into two parts which harms Hamas’s freedom of action, its sovereignty, and its ability to govern as it wishes. The infrastructure of the Hamas government and its institutions have been and are still being destroyed. The senior officials of the organization and the rest of its people are pursued and killed by the intelligence community and the IDF.

What clouds these accomplishments is the ability of Sinwar and the top of the organization in Gaza, and outside of it, to continue negotiating with Israel through the mediation of foreign countries such as Qatar which provide them protection. For this reason, although the Hamas regime in Gaza has been fatally damaged, it can be restored as long as the organization’s senior officials are not eliminated. Over the years, after many rounds of fighting against the IDF, Hamas built recovery capacity, rehabilitation and munitions production processes, allocating many resources for this. That is why the IDF must continue to have freedom of action.

To review: there are several points for testing whether Hamas has been defeated: 17,000 Hamas terrorists have been killed. Gaza has been cut into two parts. The huge underground production facilities have been destroyed. The Rafah crossing has been closed, and 80% of the smuggling tunnels in the Philadelphi route are under Israeli operational control. Hamas no longer receives huge budgets from Iran. It has distinct liquidity difficulties, and every bullet, rocket and missile it uses cannot be reproduced, or replaced from warehouses–an important strategic point.

As the IDF increases the friction against Hamas terrorists, and more weapons and ammunition caches are damaged, the transformations on the ground will be even more significant. . . . The threat has not been completely removed, as evidenced by the attempt to penetrate the Israeli border about two weeks ago, but the Hamas terrorist army has been defeated.

Hamas can no longer launch an attack on the order of thousands of terrorists and thousands of rockets in the October 7 plan, but the reality is that it has turned from an army to a guerrilla organization. There are more IDF forces that separate the Gaza from the Israeli border communities, but it is important to emphasize that the military arm of Hamas has not disappeared, and it can still carry out attacks on IDF forces deep in the territory. Over time they will have great difficulty in restoring their military capabilities–on the assumption that the IDF will control the Rafah Crossing and the Philadelphia axis, and prevent smuggling or rehabilitation capabilities.

The issue of the hostages is complex. Despite the military achievements, the political level has not been able to lead to more deals for the release of hostages. There are those who say that the Israeli government has not done enough, and others who say that the Israeli government did not submit to the dictates of Hamas. Obviously, everyone agrees that the effort to rescue the hostages must redoubled. Once again, however, the issue of the hostages should not be tied to the military achievements of the IDF.

Some say that all this government wants is for Israel to return to rule in Gaza. Anyone who wants to listen to Benjamin Netanyahu will hear that as long as he is prime minister Israel will not return to rule in Gaza, Hamas will not return to power, and the hunt for terrorist senior officials, activists and institutions in Gaza, Judea and Samaria, and all over the world.

When we come to re-examine the concept of “victory”, it can be stated at this stage that the IDF overcame the enemy and created optimum conditions to achieve its military goals. It should be praised for the determination and persistence of the military activity. At the same time, in the aspect of Gazan civilian consequences, the IDF must promote other governing alternatives in Gaza; otherwise the security system’s nightmare that Israel will be ultimately responsible for Gaza will be realized.

In the second intifada (2000-2007), the IDF succeeded in defeating Palestinian terrorism after years of fighting which involved preventing the infiltration of suicide terrorists and car bombers and dismantling most of the terrorist infrastructure. However, since 2007, the army has continued fighting Palestinian terrorism in Judea and Samaria every day and night. Military-political action will be required in Gaza in order to strengthen the IDF’s great achievements in defeating Hamas and the other terrorist organizations in Gaza.”